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Abstract
Most of the existing solutions to enterprise threat management are preventive
approaches prescribing means to prevent policy violations with varying degrees of
success. In this paper we consider the complementary scenario where a number
of security violations have already occurred, or security threats, or vulnerabilities
have been reported and a security administrator needs to generate optimal response
to these security events. We present a principled approach to study and model the
human expertize in responding to the emergent threats owing to these security
events. A recursive PLS (Partial Least Squares) based adaptive learning model is
defined using a factorial analysis of the security events together with a method for
estimating the effect of global context dependent semantic information used by the
security administrators. Presented model is theoretically optimal and operationally
recursive in nature to deal with the set of security events being generated contin-
uously. We discuss the underlying challenges and ways in which the model could
be operationalized in centralized versus decentralized, and real-time versus batch
processing modes.
Keywords: Recursive PLS, Regression, Prediction, Security, Prioritization,
Enterprise threat management
1 Background
Enterprise threat management demands effective decision making for generating op-
timal responses against the reported threats, violations, and vulnerabilities. An opti-
mization of the total response cost together with the effectiveness of the responses to
the most critical of the actual security events is a key objective for any security admin-
istrator (SA). Apart from the multitude of factors to be considered by a SA, relative
prioritization of the reported security events in order to optimize the response to these
events with limited resources, is an important and critical problem faced by SAs.
The problem of prioritization of the security events is in general a difficult problem
to solve since it requires numerous factors to be adequately considered and accurately
assessed. Examples of these factors may include security policies, profile of the re-
porting user(s), reporting time, security infrastructure etc. Most of these factors vary
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across the organizations, across time, with security priorities of the organization, user
base, other existing reported events etc. Often the way they impact the actual relative
criticality of a reported security event varies dynamically and thus cannot be accurately
predicted a priori using any static modeling approach.
Because of these difficulties, often security administrators use their own experience
based reasoning to decide the appropriate prioritization and response. Such prioritiza-
tion by an expert though might be the only option available at times, however need not
be the best possible one. Also the undue dependence on the subjective decision mak-
ing might result in inconsistent decisions. Also there may be the loss of such expertise
once an expert leaves the organization. Therefore it is quite important to consider and
formulate a principled approach to study and model the human expertize in responding
to the emergent threats owing to security events. In this paper, we attempt to fill this
gap.
1.1 Related Work
In contrast to the approach considered in this work, most of the solutions to enterprise
threat management are preventive approaches [Bis03, Rea97]. These approaches only
prescribe as to what should be done to prevent the security events or how to monitor the
policy violations but not how to deal with these security events once they have already
occurred. There are though interesting studies on how to manage security risks by mod-
eling the dynamics of potential attacker in a game theoretic setting [CRY08, LW05].
For example, a recent work by Barth et al. [BRS+09] presents an learning based game
theoretic model to study the cost-benefit trade-offs for managing an enterprise’s (non-
catastrophic) information security risks. Similarly Miura and Bambos [MKB07] pro-
pose a scheme for prioritizing vulnerabilities in networks based on the percentage of
time a random attacker would spend trying to exploit them measured in terms of net-
work topology and potential node interactions. Though these studies are interesting in
their own right, however, they still do not address the question, central to ours, as to
what should be done after an attack has actually occurred.
On the other hand there are solutions with relatively limited scope to generate au-
tomated responses for specific type of events (e.g., alarms, auto locking for resource
access etc.) For example, in the context of intrusion detection, [AASB08] presents a
fuzzy-logic based methodology to automatically prioritize the alerts. These solutions
are primarily governed by the fixed set of rules which determine the detection of an
event and generation of predefined responses accordingly [KV00]. To the best of au-
thor’s knowledge there do not appear significant (published) prior arts on the problem
of adaptive prioritization of security events to generate effective responses for handling
enterprise level threats on a wider scale.
Locasto et al. [LBB09] have recently examined the difficulty of (manually) recov-
ering from large scale network intrusion attacks. They discuss, in particular, associated
human factors, which could complicate the recovery process. There work can be con-
sidered as an important motivation and their case studies as further example scenarios
for this paper.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a system model (Sec-
tion 2.1) and a technique to model the meta-knowledge of the security experts. Sec-
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tion 3 presents discussion on operationalizing the presented approach. Section 4 dis-
cusses potential challenges in realizing the approach in practice, underlying technical
limitations, and possible alternative solution approaches to the problem. Finally, con-
cluding remarks and directions for further work appear in Section 5.
2 The Model
We propose a linear adaptive learning based approach, which is aimed towards design-
ing a system which could effectively assist the security administrators to prioritize the
reported security events. Learning aspect specifies that the responses of the system
should increasingly match against security experts’ responses over time.
2.1 The System Model
Let χt be the set of all reported but unfinished (i.e., no decision taken) instances of
security events at some time point t. It is assumed that occurrences of security events
are (statistically) independent of each other. These instances of the security events in
χt are to be suitably prioritized for optimal response. Let Υ be the set of priorities to
be assigned to the reported security events such that higher priority is represented by
higher numerical value.
Also let Π be the set of all the environmental factors which impact the criticality
level/relative priority of the reported security events. Examples of such factors may
include:
1. Type of the associated security policies and their measured business value.
2. Profile of the reporting user(s):
• Number of users reporting the same security event.
• Mutual relationship between the reporting user(s).
• Relationship of the reporting user(s) with the policy and violation based
upon job role and responsibility: expected close relation/generic relation-
ship/remote relation.
3. Reporting time/delay.
4. Past violation history and response rating for the event.
5. Type of the Violation:
• Sensitive data manipulation.
• Physical Access violations.
• Unauthorized disclosure of strategic information (e.g., IP)
• Financial irregularities.
• Intentional information hiding.
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• Business code of conduct violation.
6. Supporting evidence from the automated monitoring system, if available.
7. External factors including policy regulations, natural exigencies etc.
Based upon these, aim is to define a procedure:
f [v, χt, env] 7→ priority (1)
where v ∈ χt , env ⊆ Π, and priority ∈ Υ. f essentially denotes the decision mak-
ing process ideally employed by a SA to determine the relative priority of a violation v
as compared to all other violations currently present in χt using the knowledge of the
associated environmental factors.
Owing to the inherent difficulty in formulating a closed form solution i.e., an al-
gorithm which completely solves the problem, we consider an adaptive learning based
approach, which can approximately capture the desired effect of such a procedure.
Let us define a function f as:
f(v, t, χ, env,pri) ≡
n∑
i=0
βiv ∗ xiv(t) + ∆t(v) (2)
where xiv ∈ env are the environmental factors affecting the priority/criticality level
of the reported violation v ∈ χt and βiv is the weight (coefficient) for the factor xiv .
These coefficients are initialized to 1 in the beginning. xiv(t) is the measured value of
xiv at time-point t w.r.t. violation v. χ = {χi|0 ≤ i ≤ t} collects the sets of violations
at time points till current and pri collects the corresponding sets of (relative) priorities
assigned to these violations by the SA. Their role in Eq.(2) will become clear soon
when we define ∆t(v).
The first term appearing in the r.h.s. in Eq. (2) is the usual linear model used in
regression analysis [DS98], however the second term is new to this approach. The
second term, ∆t(v), is the average relative historical priority of the violation v, which
will be defined later.
Notice that the first term,
∑n
i=0 βiv ∗ xiv(t), appearing in the r.h.s. in Eq. (2),
only considers those factors which impact the violation v. Sometimes it may not be
sufficient to only consider these factors in isolation to determine the relative priority of
a violation. In such scenarios a security expert needs to make a decision on the relative
priority of v, with the knowledge that
• Many other types of violations are also present at the same time and different
sets of factors may characterize these violations.
• Some global ‘meta-level’ information is critical to consider e.g. current expertise
of the security response team, underlying connectivity topology etc.
It is important to add that such context sensitive meta knowledge is assumed to be
not expressible either algebraically or in statistical terms (e.g., correlation) using only
the factors present in the linear terms, i.e., x1v, x2v, . . . , x1w, x2w, . . ., and associated
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d14 = 8 
System Priorities:  fv1 > fv2 > fv4 > fv3 
Administrator’s Priorities:  Pv1 > Pv4  > Pv2  > Pv3 
Cost of Response [System] = 2* (4+6+7+9)  = 52 
Cost of Response [Administrator] = 4+8+7+ 6+4+9  = 38 
d1 = 4 
o d3 = 9 
v3 
d23 = 4 
d2 = 6 
v2 Short-cut 
d4 = 7 
v4 
Figure 1: Comparison between Overall Costs of Linear System’s Response and SA’s
Response
priorities priorityv , priorityw, . . . These correlations if present among the factors
and the priorities would be dealt with using the standard partial least square regression
learning as discussed later in Section 2.2. Let us consider an example to motivate
the need for introducing the second term in the model: Consider a scenario (Fig. 1)
where security events v1, v2, v3, and v4 have been reported. Suppose the key factor
which is known about these security events is the distance of their occurrences from
the security control room (point o in the figure) from where a security response team
would be sent to attend these security events. Let these distances be d1, d2, d3, and d4
such that d1 < d2 < d4 < d3. As per the linear term appearing in the r.h.s. of Eq. (2),
system would determine the priorities as fv1 > fv2 > fv4 > fv3 , where fvi represents
the priority given to event vi. However, a SA may use the knowledge of the fact that
if v4 is assigned higher priority over v2 because point of occurrence of v4 and v1 have
a connection, it would reduce the overall distance to be covered even though d4 > d2.
Overall costs corresponding to the priorities given by the linear system model as well as
the SA’s responses are illustrated in the Fig. 1. Such considerations demand that system
should consider the overall cost of the response rather than the individual responses
in isolation. Since in general the factors (or meta-considerations), which need to be
considered globally across more than one violation are specific to the security events
and other surrounding conditions, modeling them statically is infeasible and therefore
we define the second term, ∆t(v), in the Eq. (2) to overcome this limitation.
∆t(v), is the average relative historical priority associated with a violation v as
compared to other security events sharing the history with v. In other words, ∆t(v)
captures the effect of earlier priorities assigned to the violation v by the SA w.r.t. some
other security events in χt, which were also present together with v at those time points
in the past. Formally, we define it as follows:
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Let
H(t, v) = {χu | [0 ≤ u < t] ∧ [v ∈ χu]}
be ranged over by χt,u. H(t, v) contains the sets of security events, in past, containing
v. Let
χvt,u = (χt,u ∩ χt) \ {v}
χvt,u, in turn, collects those security events in χt, which were also present together
with v at the time point u. Let priu(x) be the absolute priority assigned to a violation
x ∈ χu by the SA. Also let αu(v) be the valuation of the Eq. (2), i.e., predicted priority,
at time u for violation v.
Now define, for w ∈ χvt,u:
ϕu(v, w) =
{
0 if (priu(v)− priu(w)) ∗ (αu(v)− αu(w)) > 0
1 otherwise
(3)
ϕu(v, w) determines whether there is a directionality mismatch between the relative
priorities assigned to security events v andw at time-point u by the linear system model
and the SA. ϕu(v, w) = 1 indicates that there is a directionality mismatch, which is
likely to be owing to the presence of some meta-factors as discussed before. The effect
of these meta factors need to be suitably measured. The term λvt,u defined next is one
possible way to measure this.
λvt,u =

∑
∀w∈χvt,u
[ϕu(v, w)(priu(v)− priu(w))] if χt,u ∈ H(t, v)
0 otherwise
Informally, λvt,u represents total relative priority of the violation v (as determined by
the SA) as compared to all other security event w present both in the current set of
security events χt as well as in the set of security events at time-point u.
In terms of the above, ∆t is defined as follows:
∆t(v) =
{
d(M∗N )e if [t > 0] ∧ [(∑0≤u<t λvt,u) > 0]
0 otherwise
(4)
Notation: dae returns the smallest integer greater than a. In the Eq. ( 4)
M =
∑
0≤u<t λ
v
t,u
|metat(t)| and
N = (|Ωt(v)|+ 1)|χt| where
Θvt,u = χ
v
t,u \ {w ∈ χvt,u | ϕu(v, w) = 0},
metat(v) = {Θvt,u | 0 ≤ u < t and Θvt,u 6= ∅}, and
Ωt(v) =
⋃
Y∈ metat(v)
Y
6
Θvt,u is the set of all those security events present at time point u for which there was
a directionality mismatch w.r.t. violation v. Those Θvt,u, which are non empty, are
collected in metat(v) so that |metat(v)| is the number of time points where at least
one directionality mismatch was present for violation v. M estimates total relative
priority of the violation v as compared to all other security events in χt sharing history
with it averaged over these past time points. Ωt(v), in turn, collects all these security
events in χt, which have shared history with v at any time-point in the past. Defined
in terms of these, N is the normalization factor estimating the fraction of χt, having
shared history with v and ∆t(v) is the normalized relative priority for v, which should
asymptotically approach to the priority estimates by the SA over the course of time
reflecting the numerical significance of the meta-factors.
2.2 Learning and Adaptation
We now discuss a learning scheme to estimate the coefficients βiv appearing in the
linear summation term of the function f defined in Eq. (2).
We adapt the recursive partial least square regression (RPLS) technique defined in
[Qin98]. Multiple regression is a powerful statistical modeling and prediction tool
which has found wide applications in biological, behavioral and social sciences to
describe relationships between variables. Least square estimations (LSE) are among
the most frequently used estimation techniques in multiple linear regression analysis
[CPWA03], [DS98]. Intuitively, least square estimates aim to estimate the model pa-
rameters (coefficients) such that total sum of squared errors (deviation from the ideal
system response of the model’s output) is minimized. Important feature of these LSE
is that their derivations employ standard operations from matrix calculus, and therefore
they bring with them the theoretical proofs of optimality. Partial Least Square (PLS)
based regression is an extension of the basic LSE technique which can effectively ana-
lyze data with many noisy, collinear, and even incomplete variables as input or output.
We now discuss the RPLS algorithm as adopted from [Qin98], which extends PLS to
deal with online data.
Let Yvt = prit(v)−∆t(v) be the history adapted response of the SA for violation
v in χt and Yv = [Yv0, Yv1, . . . , Yvt]T be the column vector collecting Yvt for all the
instances of the violation type v present in χ0, χ1, . . . χt.
Also define Xvt = [x0v(t)x1v(t) . . . xkv(t)] where xiv(t) is the value of the ith
factor xiv at time t and Xv = [Xv0Xv1 . . . Xvt]. Note that, Yv = XvBv , where
Bv = [β0vβ1v . . . βkv].
Now we can use the RPLS algorithm from [Qin98] to get the regression estimates
for Bv as presented in Algorithm 1. For theoretical considerations, RPLS estimation
assumes that input data (i.e., Xv) is independently and identically distributed over time
(thus precludes auto-correlations) and is independent of errors.
Claim 1 The correctness of the Algorithm 1 as well as the optimality of the final re-
gression coefficients follows from [Qin98].
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Algorithm 1 Estimating regression coefficients for those security events for which
there is no directionality mismatch.
Inputs: History DatabaseH = {χ0, χ1, . . . , χt−1}. Current set χt of security events
at time-point t and SA’s priorities for the security events in χt. D[]: Boolean array to
indicate directionality mismatch. D[w] = 0 indicates that there exist directionality
mismatch for event w at some time point before t andD[w] = 0 indicates otherwise.
{I}nitialize the Boolean array D[] for each event w in χ.
if (t == 0) then
for all event (w ∈ χ) do
D[w] = 0;
end for
end if
{C}ollect those events in χt for which is there is no directionality mis-
match in Ψt.
Ψt = ∅;
for all event w ∈ χt do
if (D[w] == 0) then
Ψt = Ψt ∪ {w};
end if
end for
RPLS:: {E}stimate Regression Coefficients for events in Ψt.
for all event v ∈ Ψt do
[R1]: Let the existing PLS model for violation v w.r.t. the history database H be
(as per the algorithm presented in [Qin98]): {Xv;Yv} ⇒ {T ;W ;P ;B;Q}. With
the new pair of data, let Xv = [PTXvt]T and Yv = [BQTYvt]T .
[R2]: Carry out the algorithm presented in [Qin98] with {Xv;Yv} until ||Er|| ≤ ,
where r = rank(Xv) and  is the error tolerance.
end for
{I}dentify events for which global meta factors are potentially indicated.
for all (v, w) ∈ (χt × χt) do
if (D[v] == 0) ∨ (D[w] == 0) then
Estimate ϕt(v, w) as per equation (3);
if (ϕt(v, w) == 0) then
D[v] = D[w] = 1;
end if
end if
end for
{U}pdate History Database.
H = H ∪ χt;
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3 Operationalizing the Approach
The proposed adaptive learning framework can be operationalized by implementing the
suggested model. At the beginning the system would need to be initialized by the SAs
for the set of relevant security events deemed significant for the organization together
with the set of environmental factors. The coefficients βiv in Eq. (2) are initialized to
1 in the beginning (or as specified by the SA).
Fig. 2 depicts a high level schematic representation of the overall system design The
learning system need to be integrated with the database containing the list of reported
security events and valuations for the associated factors. A suitable interface could
be used to get inputs from the SA determining the expert assigned priorities to these
security events. Based upon these inputs and the valuations of the associated factors,
the system would calculate the relative priority of a reported security event. In turn
the system would adapt the weights of the factors for those security events, where
its calculated priorities had significant deviation from the expert assigned priorities.
Various modes of execution for the system could be considered as below:
 
Adaptive Learning 
System 
  Inputs 
Predicted Priorities 
History 
Database 
Expert Priorities 
+ 
Learning 
Reported Violations 
Reported 
Violation/Threat 
Database 
Figure 2: High Level Schematic Representation of Overall System Design
Online versus Offline Modes of Execution: The proposed model can be practiced
both online as well as in offline modes. This depends upon the choice of the time
intervals (updation periods) at which the implemented system is presented with the new
data (reported security events) as decided by the SA at the time of system configuration.
If the choice of the time interval is comparable (or less than) the delay with which new
security events are being reported, the system would effectively work in an online
mode, depicting the priorities as each new event is reported and adapting itself as per
the expert response corresponding to the event. On the other hand if the time interval
at which the system is presented with the new data is relatively large, the system would
effectively operate in an offline mode using the batch of data. A choice of the updation
period would determine when the learning system fetches the new set of data from the
database of reported security events.
Real-time versus Non-Real-time Modes of Execution: The proposed model can
be practiced both real-time as well as in non-real-time modes. This again depends upon
the clock synchronization for the time intervals (updation periods) at which the imple-
mented system is presented with the new data (reported security events) and the time at
which it was actually reported. Thus for real-time execution, the learning system would
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need to be tightly coupled with the database of reported security events so that as and
when a new event is being reported, the learning system can work with it. For this the
database needs to be updated on real-time basis. For non-real-time mode of operation,
the learning system could be presented the new data as per the settings defined by the
SA.
Centralized versus Decentralized Modes of Execution: The proposed model
can be practiced both centralized as well as in decentralized modes. The differentiation
arises in the modes of maintaining the reported event database. In a decentralized
case, local copies of the databases need to be maintained at different sites and multiple
instances of the model can execute at these sites concurrently by integrating with the
local database copies. Multiple processes could adapt for the same type of the security
event at different sites. However, in order for these processes to synchronize with
each other for those security events, which are exclusively being handled at only one
site, the corresponding process needs to send the latest model (Eq. (2)) to the other
processes together with the copy of the history database. After receiving the model as
well as the history database, other process could start adapting the model hence after -
this step is generally known as model aggregation [BA03]. For those types of security
events, for which different processes at different sites have evolved different models,
a possible way when two processes synchronize is to keep that model which possibly
have evolved using larger number of reported security events till that moment. Such
decision need to be taken by the SA on a case to case basis. Another alternative is
to send the copy of the history database, which can be used by other process to adapt
its own model further and then communicate the updated model back to the original
process for future application.
4 Challenges, Limitations, and Alternatives
The primary challenge in realizing the approach is to deal with the dynamics of the
factors which determine the criticality of a security event at a specific time point. The
presented solution demands that from the beginning all the (measurable) factors affect-
ing the criticality of a (possible) security event should be known (or at least from the
time, when such event is first reported/observed.) This might be difficult to achieve in
practice since new factors for the same event (type) might come to light only over a
course of time and might change owing to (often uncertain) environmental factors e.g.,
introduction of new legal governmental policies etc. In such cases, estimates owing to
RPLS for the regression coefficients for that security event might become incorrect for
the future use - thus necessitating to restart the estimation process discarding the exist-
ing estimates. Another challenge is to ensure the reliability of the SA’s responses since
this may well vary with the experience of the SA and might be different for different
administrators. The final challenge is to ensure the numerical preciseness in measuring
the values for various factors for a security event.
Apart from these challenges a statistical learning methodology has its own limita-
tions. One limitation is that it can not work with symbolic or linguistic information.
For example, at times it is possible that a SA applies certain meta rules instead of
the meta factors considered in this work. Such meta rules might not be expressible
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using only the ∆ factor or the linear factorial model. However, there are approaches
proposed in the literature for overcoming this limitation e.g., Fuzzy Sets [KY95]. A po-
tential extension to the presented model could be considered as fuzzy RPLS regression
approach [Sav91].
Next, let us discuss some of the possible alternative models for defining (1): Under
the linear modeling framework only plausible way to alternatively model term ∆ is to
make the model dynamically add explicit new measures for meta factors in the set env
as and when they are identified by the SA and further include these factors suitably in
the linear summation term
∑
i βiv ∗ xiv . Such an approach would necessarily demand
adequate technical know-how on the linear modeling approaches on the part of the
SAs. It is also possible that the actual underlying model of the specification Eq. (1) is
a non-linear model on xiv ∈ env, which will invariably result into prediction errors
when using a linear model as in Eq. (2). ∆ term also may not be sufficient to capture
the effect of such non-linearities. In such cases adoption of a non-linear learning model
(e.g., Neural Networks [Hay08], Support Vector Machine [SC08] etc.) in place of the
linear summation term in Eq. (2) is possibly necessary. Even with these non-linear
predictive models, it is possible that there are meta-factors present in the environment,
for which ∆ term might be required as an approximate measure.
There are alternatives to RPLS estimation as well. For example, state space based
models [DK01] can be used when auto-correlations exist in the time-series for envi-
ronmental factors in env. These state space models can be either deterministic or
stochastic in nature. Similarly there are non-linear alternative to PLS, e.g., kernel-
PLS [LGW93], which can be used in Algorithm 1, in particular, in steps [R1] and
[R2].
It is important to add that, apart from the simplicity, a linear model is often a pre-
ferred choice for its explanatory property. This means, if a SA intends to know how the
system has arrived at a a specific priority level, the factorial analysis would generally
provide an easily comprehensible explanation extracted from the linear model when
compared to other modeling approaches, in particular, the non-linear ones.
5 Conclusion and Further Work
We have presented a method for designing an adaptive system to prioritize reported
security events. This prioritization might eventually result into dashboard display in-
dicating the degree of criticality of the reported events in order to generate an optimal
response. The proposed method specifies design of an adaptive learning system as a
linear model employing the factorial analysis of the security events in terms of all the
organization specific measurable factors associated with these events. Furthermore, we
specify a method for estimating and learning global context sensitive meta-knowledge
employed by the security expert for assigning relative priorities to the security events,
which otherwise are difficult to capture in a factorial model. The system can identify
the possible presence of global context sensitive knowledge used by a SA for optimiz-
ing the responses to the security events and in turn can use that in future.
Owing to the optimality of the RPLS technique and the averaging definition given
to the ∆ factor in terms of the historical response data, the overall system optimally
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minimizes the overall error as compared to the SA’s responses in an asymptotic sense.
By nature, it is difficult to acquire data for empirically evaluating performance of the
presented system (e.g., convergence rate, average error rate etc.) unless a fully oper-
ational tool realizing the model is deployed in a relatively large organization. So the
expectation is that by design the model should be correct and optimality of the param-
eter estimation should follow from the theoretical grounds. A formal proof towards
establishing these performance parameters need to be considered in future together
with using the data generated from the deployment of the model in a realistic scenario.
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